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ARMY RE-ENLISTMENT DURING OIF/OEF: BONUSES, DEPLOYMENT, AND STOP-LOSS

机译:在OIF / OEF期间重新征兵:奖金,部署和制止

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摘要

In 2004, stretched by wartime deployments, the US Army countered declining retention by increasing re-enlistment bonuses and implementing stop-loss to prevent soldiers from separating at the end of their enlistment. We estimate the effects of bonuses, deployment, and stop-loss on re-enlistment between FY 2002 and 2006. We estimate that the baseline propensity to re-enlist fell by 20%. However, we find that deployed soldiers are more likely to re-enlist and that the estimated effects of re-enlistment bonuses are similar to those estimated in peacetime. We evaluate the reasons for our findings, and calculate the cost effectiveness of re-enlistment bonuses.
机译:2004年,在战时部署的压力下,美国陆军通过增加重新入伍奖金和实施停损措施来防止兵力下降,以防止士兵在入伍后离职。我们估算了2002财年至2006财年奖金,调配和止损对重新入伍的影响。我们估计,重新入伍的基准倾向下降了20%。但是,我们发现部署的士兵更有可能重新入伍,重新入伍奖金的估计效果类似于和平时期的估计效果。我们评估发现结果的原因,并计算重新入职奖金的成本效益。

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