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Critical Response of Pakistan on the Indian Nuclear Ambitions: From indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal to Inclusion into NSC

机译:巴基斯坦对印度核野心的批判性回应:从印美民用核协议到纳入NSC

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India is known to be pursuing a long-term three-stage nuclear energy program for many decades which is essentially, at the first stage, planned to build a breed of heavy water power reactors that would generate Plutonium to fuel breeder reactors, and then it would build another breed of advanced heavy water reactor which could use extra oxide fuel especially Thorium. At present, India has not been able to fully implement the second stage. It hasn't even been able to commission its first prototype fast breeder reactor. The official Indian position has been that eight power reactors and the breeder program are outside the IAEA safeguards as part of India's strategic stockpile. It is assumed that India will be keeping spent fuel Plutonium produced in these reactors, outside the IAEA Safeguards to be used as part of the second stage which is to fuel the breeder fleet. This was in fact accepted in 2008 as part of IAEA separation plan. Contrary to Indian claims that it would be building 5 to 6 breeder reactors, New Delhi is still not able to commission the first reactor. Therefore this study makes the point that the availability of 16 tons civil Plutonium outside IAEA safeguards could be diverted to weapons use. With ability to reprocess the spent fuel through her four reprocessing plants and inclusion of another one, India would be able to enhance its reprocessing capacity up to 2000 tons until next decade. This issue highlights Indian gambling on her commitments related to separation between civil and military nuclear activities. Pakistan must not become prey to Indian gambling and must expose her lies at appropriate forums particularly NSG with that of presenting Islamabad's bid to join the export control cartel. Also Islamabad should not hesitate to highlight Indian nuclear ambitions to offset the strategic stability in South Asia. This article has attempted to present holistic viewpoint to understand Indian motivation to join NSG with that of United States attempt to construct new security environment in South Asia that it initiated through strategic civil nuclear deal.
机译:众所周知,印度数十年来一直在追求长期的三阶段核能计划,该计划实质上是在第一阶段计划建造一个重水动力反应堆,该反应堆将产生P作为燃料,为核反应堆提供燃料,然后将建造另一座先进的重水反应堆,该堆可以使用额外的氧化物燃料,尤其是Thor。目前,印度还不能完全实施第二阶段。它甚至还无法调试其首个原型快速增殖反应堆。印度的官方立场是,作为印度战略储备的一部分,八个反应堆和增殖器计划不在国际原子能机构的保障范围之内。据推测,印度将在国际原子能机构保障措施之外保留这些反应堆中生产的乏燃料P,用作第二阶段的一部分,该阶段将为育种船队提供燃料。实际上,这是2008年作为原子能机构离职计划的一部分接受的。与印度声称将建造5至6座核反应堆相反,新德里仍然无法调试第一个反应堆。因此,这项研究指出,在国际原子能机构保障措施之外可获得的16吨民用availability可以转用于武器使用。印度有能力通过其四个后处理厂对乏燃料进行后处理,并拥有另一个后处理厂,到下一个十年,印度将能够将其后处理能力提高至2000吨。这个问题突出显示了印度在赌博方面做出的与民用和军用核活动分开有关的承诺。巴基斯坦不得成为印度赌博的牺牲品,必须在适当的论坛上(尤其是在NSG上)揭露自己的谎言,其中包括提出伊斯兰堡要约加入出口管制卡特尔。伊斯兰堡也应毫不犹豫地强调印度的核野心,以抵消南亚的战略稳定。本文试图提出整体观点,以理解印度加入NSG的动机与美国试图通过战略性民用核协议在南亚建立新的安全环境的动机。

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  • 来源
    《Defence journal》 |2019年第11期|14-18|共5页
  • 作者

    TAUQEER HUSSAIN SARGANA;

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  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 04:21:03

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