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首页> 外文期刊>Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory >Divide and Rule: Privatisation in Poland and the Working Class
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Divide and Rule: Privatisation in Poland and the Working Class

机译:分而治之:波兰的私有化与工人阶级

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Contrary to what has been assumed implicitly by lawmakers, by no means all shareholders (notably the rank-and-file employees), of the newly privatised companies are real co-owners of the share capital. In order to address this question, we need sharper analytical tools than those used in the conventional analyses of the subject. Put differently, a set of criteria identifying the types of economic ownership associated with shareholdings of a different size must be developed.Privatisation converts workers into merely formal owners of share capital, while real ownership is vested in management. Employee ownership is vulnerable to success as well as to failure. If the firm is prosperous and profitable, increasingly valuable shares will encourage their sale to outside investors. On the other hand, the worker, like the average person, is induced to sell his shares when the price declines as he is usually not in a financial position where he could afford to take a loss on his investment. In addition, the mechanisms of control, and especially workers' inability to determine the policies of their companies, discourage many employees from keeping their shares.From the standpoint of the governmental makers of the privatisation policy, shares given to employees and workers in particular were an attempt at buying their neutrality towards this policy, but turned out to play a very useful latent function consisting in them being the factor of internal divisions and a seed-plot of conflicts.View full textDownload full textKeywordsPrivatisation, Economic Ownership, Employee Ownership, Managerial Ownership, PolandRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2011.537455
机译:与立法者所隐含的假设相反,新私有化的公司绝不是所有股东(特别是普通雇员),都是股本的真正共同所有人。为了解决这个问题,我们需要比该主题的常规分析中使用的分析工具更强大的分析工具。换句话说,必须建立一套确定与不同规模的股份相关的经济所有权类型的标准。私有化将工人转变为仅股本的正式所有者,而实际所有权归属于管理层。员工拥有权容易受到成功和失败的影响。如果公司繁荣和盈利,那么越来越有价值的股票将鼓励其出售给外部投资者。另一方面,由于价格通常较低,因此工人像普通人一样被诱使出售股票,因为他通常没有财务状况,因而无法承担投资损失。此外,控制机制,尤其是工人无力决定公司政策的做法,使许多雇员不愿保留股份。从政府私有化政策制定者的角度来看,给予雇员和工人特别是试图购买他们对这项政策的中立性,但结果却发挥了非常有用的潜在功能,其中包括内部分裂和冲突的种种因素。查看全文下载全文关键字私有化,经济所有权,雇员所有权,管理波兰所有权,相关的变量var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”} ;添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2011.537455

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