The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration - Malaysian evidence

摘要

Purpose - This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by ownership concentration. The complementary view predicts that good internal governance mechanisms are related to high-quality audit. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms may be substituted for each other, so more investment in governance mechanisms leads to less investment in external auditing. Therefore, this study aims to examine the association between internal governance mechanisms and the demand for audit quality. Design/methodology/approach - Data from Malaysian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2012 are used. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied to analyse the data. Findings - Companies with a higher concentration of ownership are less likely to demand extensive auditing. In addition, the study provides supporting evidence for the complementary association between a company's governance and audit fees. However, the ownership concentration plays a minor role in the positive association between internal corporate governance and audit quality. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings. Practical implications - Significant implications are provided for the audit profession in emerging economies, where concentrated ownership is common, to help policymakers and regulators in determining the power of controlling shareholders on audit quality and firm's governance. The study's findings open up avenues for further research. Originality/value - This is the first work to address the role of ownership concentration in the association between corporate governance and audit quality; it suggests that the ownership structure must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. The study also provides a comprehensive combination of internal governance mechanisms.