Attacks via record multiplicity on cancelable biometrics templates

摘要

Various template protection techniques have been developed in the past few years, among which cancelablernbiometrics is a very popular and efficient one. It uses a noninvertible transformation to map an originalrntemplate to a transformed domain to prevent the recovery of the original template from a compromisedrntransformed template. Generally, cross-template attacks over cancellable template schemes are evaluatedrnthrough statistic independence metrics. In this paper, we investigate approaches to launch attacks throughrncryptanalysis. Four typical cancelable fingerprint template design algorithms have been investigated byrnapplying the attack via record multiplicity attack to retrieve the original template. Concrete attack examplesrnare also given to make the demonstration more intuitive and comprehensive. The results show that all ofrnthem are vulnerable if an attacker can obtain multiple transformed templates and their correspondingrntransformation parameters.