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Pricing-based interference management scheme in LTE-V2V communication with imperfect channel state information

机译:具有不完美信道状态信息的LTE-V2V通信的基于定价的干扰管理方案

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In this paper, an effective LTE-V2V (long-term-evolution vehicle-to-vehicle) communication system is studied, where the uplink channel of the cellular user equipment (CUE) is reused by the multiple V2V links. Considering the co-channel interference caused by channel reusing between CUE and V2V links, a pricing framework of interference management for V2V links and CUE is proposed. In the LTE-V2V communication networks, the base station (BS) protects the serving CUE by pricing the cross-tier interference caused by V2V links. A Stackelberg game is presented to model the interaction between the BS and V2V links. In order to ensure the communication quality of CUE, the total interference generated by V2V links has to be lower than the interference threshold. Specifically, the BS prices the tolerable interference to maximize its revenue. For the given prices, the V2V links competitively adapt their power allocation strategies to maximize the individual utility. Two pricing iterative algorithms, uniform pricing scheme and the non-uniform pricing scheme, are proposed to incorporate with the theory of noncooperative game, in order to analyze the competition between V2V links. In addition, the time-varying characteristics of vehicle communication are considered due to the high-speed mobility of the V2V users. The imperfect channel state information (CSI) fading model is constructed with the large-scale fading and small-scale fading jointly. Numerical simulation results validate the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
机译:在本文中,研究了有效的LTE-V2V(长期演进车载车辆)通信系统,其中蜂窝用户设备的上行链路信道由多个V2V链路重复使用。考虑到由CUE和V2V链路之间的信道重用引起的共信道干扰,提出了V2V链路和提示的干扰管理定价框架。在LTE-V2V通信网络中,基站(BS)通过定价由V2V链路引起的交叉层干扰来保护服务提示。提出了一个Stackelberg游戏以模拟BS和V2V链路之间的相互作用。为了确保提示的通信质量,V2V链路产生的总干扰必须低于干扰阈值。具体而言,BS价格可容忍的干扰,以最大限度地提高其收入。对于给定的价格,V2V链接竞争地调整其权力分配策略,以最大限度地提高个人效用。提出了两种定价迭代算法,统一定价方案和非均匀定价方案,以与非支持性游戏理论合并,以分析V2V链路之间的竞争。另外,由于V2V用户的高速移动性,考虑了车辆通信的时变特性。不完美的信道状态信息(CSI)衰落模型采用大规模衰落和小规模的褪色构建。数值模拟结果验证了所提出的算法的可靠性和有效性。

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