Efficiency and Detectability of Random Reactive Jamming in Carrier Sense Wireless Networks

摘要

A natural basis for the detection of a wireless random reactive jammer (RRJ) is the perceived violation by the detector [typically located at the access point (AP)] of the carrier sensing protocol underpinning many wireless random access protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi). Specifically, when the wireless medium is perceived by a station to be busy, a carrier sensing compliant station will avoid transmission, while an RRJ station will often initiate transmission. However, hidden terminals (HTs), i.e., activity detected by the AP but not by the sensing station, complicate the use of carrier sensing as the basis for RRJ detection since they provide plausible deniability to a station suspected of being an RRJ. The RRJ has the dual objectives of avoiding detection and effectively disrupting communication, but there is an inherent performance tradeoff between these two objectives. In this paper, we capture the behavior of both the RRJ and the compliant stations via a parsimonious Markov chain model and pose the detection problem using the framework of the Markov chain hypothesis testing. Our analysis yields the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of the detector and the optimized behavior of the RRJ. While there has been extensive work in the literature on jamming detection, our innovation lies in leveraging carrier sensing as a natural and effective basis for detection.