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Open vs. sealed-bid auctions: testing for revenue equivalence under Singapore's vehicle quota system

机译:公开竞标与密封竞标:在新加坡车辆配额制度下测试收入对等

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摘要

Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1000 (about 7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction format.
机译:利用新加坡的车辆配额许可证拍卖数据,我们研究了自2001年7月起拍卖形式从密封式竞标格式(1990年5月更改为2001年6月)转换为公开竞标格式后,收入等值是否成立。我们的计量经济学分析表明拍卖形式的改变导致竞标行为的改变。平均而言,公开竞价形式下的配额许可溢价比在拍卖中没有变化的情况下的预测水平要低约1000美元(约为2001年6月E类许可价格的7.5%)。格式。

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