Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naievete, and Sophistication in Experimental 'Hide-and-Seek' Games

摘要

"Hide-and-seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econo-metrically suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural nonequi-librium model of initial responses based on "level-k" thinking, suitably adapted to nonneutral landscapes.