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Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

机译:信任是社会规范和激励计划隐性成本的信号

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摘要

Economists tend to believe that incentive contracts are beneficial when most aspects of performance are measurable, as they make employees work harder. Indeed, there are some recent empirical studies on single firms showing that incentive contracts have raised productivity significantly. However, descriptive evidence on the limited overall frequency of use of pay-for-performance schemes may call for more caution. There seem to be very different views in individual firms on whether contracts based on individual performance are beneficial or not. Whereas some see incentive contracts as an important component of their human resource management practices, others take a much more skeptical view and even consider extrinsic incentives harmful.
机译:经济学家倾向于认为,在绩效的大多数方面都是可衡量的时,激励合同是有益的,因为它们会使员工更加努力地工作。确实,最近有一些关于单一公司的实证研究表明,激励合同已大大提高了生产率。但是,有关使用绩效工资计划的总体频率有限的描述性证据可能需要格外小心。对于基于个人绩效的合同是否有益,各个公司似乎存在着截然不同的观点。有些人将激励合同视为其人力资源管理实践的重要组成部分,而另一些人则持怀疑态度,甚至认为外部激励是有害的。

著录项

  • 来源
    《The American economic review》 |2007年第3期|999-1012|共14页
  • 作者

    Dirk Sliwka;

  • 作者单位

    University of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 50931 Koeln, Germany;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 宏观经济学;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:27:57

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