Many important financial decisions occur in the workplace. In the United States, for example, 66 percent of all employees hold their retirement savings in an employer-sponsored account. In developing countries, integrating financial choices into a workplace setting, through electronic payroll accounts and other digital financial products, is seen as a low-cost gateway for broadening financial inclusion, and as a platform for banks to introduce new financial products to unbanked populations. A large empirical literature has studied individual financial decisions through the lens of financial literacy, behavioral frictions, and peer effects. However, weknow little about the impacts of involving the employer in financial decision-making.In this paper, we examine whether employees exhibit strategic behavior in financial decisions that are made in the workplace, and that are plausibly observable to their employer. We study this question in a developing country setting, where such financial choices are typically automated and more likely to require an interaction with one's manager or employer. Employers might use this information to make inferences about a worker's type, their work performance, or commitment to the firm. As a result, workers may choose a financial product offered by their employer to signal that they are financially responsible, or that they are receptive to their employer's advice. They might also be willing to adopt financial products with a commitment component to signal their intention to remain employed with the firm. Given the generally high rates of labor turnover in the manufacturing sector in developing countries, this might be a particularly valuable signal for workers to send Adhvaryu, Kala, and Nyshadham (2017).
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