Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

摘要

You're a system administrator running some routine checks on your data-management functions when you come across something that at first looks like nothing more than a system hiccup. Upon closer examination, which includes checking the servers and hardware, you find that some codes and information have been changed, revealing a more serious problem. Is this the work of thrill-seeking hackers, attempted sabotage by internal personnel, or a cyber attack? If the latter, do you retaliate or simply pretend it never happened? Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar , which addresses the subjects of the book's title in the Internet age, examines cyber war's radical differences from conventional war and the difficulty of implementing and enforcing a policy of cyber deterrence. With regard to a nation that has a policy of cyber deterrence, the author also raises such issues as determining the identity of the attacker, his motive, and the nature of the response (e.g., retaliating, ignoring the incident, or pretending it caused little damage); assessing the importance of such a determination; following a "no tolerance" policy versus attempting to distinguish between a true cyber attack and hacking; and conducting a cyber war or implementing a deterrence strategy, which includes formulating reasons for doing so and ending a war that has no outward signs of damage, casualties, or immediate (theoretically) effects.