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On Modeling of Coevolution of Strategies and Structure in Autonomous Overlay Networks

机译:自主覆盖网络中策略与结构协同进化的建模

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摘要

Currently, on one hand, there exist much work about network formation and/or growth models, and on the other hand, cooperative strategy evolutions are extensively investigated in biological, economic, and social systems. Generally, overlay networks are heterogeneous, dynamic, and distributed environments managed by multiple administrative authorities, shared by users with different and competing interests, or even autonomously provided by independent and rational users. Thus, the structure of a whole overlay network and the peers' rational strategies are ever coevolving. However, there are very few approaches that theoretically investigate the coevolution between network structure and individual rational behaviors. The main motivation of our article lies in that: Unlike existing work which empirically illustrates the interaction between rational strategies and network structure (through simulations), based on EGT (Evolutionary Game Theory), we not only infer a condition that could favor the cooperative strategy over defect strategy, but also theoretically characterizes the structural properties of the formed network. Specifically, our contributions are twofold. First, we strictly derive the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (blc) that would facilitate the evolution of cooperation. The critical ratio depends on the network structure (the number of peers in system and the average degree of each peer), and the evolutionary rule (the strategy and linking mutation probabilities). Then, according to the evolutionary rules, we formally derive the structural properties of the formed network in full cooperative state. Especially, the degree distribution is compatible with the power-law, and the exponent is (4-3υ)/(l-3υ), where v is peer's linking mutation probability. Furthermore, we show that, without being harmful to cooperation evolution, a slight change of the evolutionary rule will evolve the network into a small-world structure (high global efficiency and average clustering coefficient), with the same power-law degree distribution as in the original evolution model.
机译:当前,一方面,有关网络形成和/或增长模型的工作很多,另一方面,在生物,经济和社会系统中,对合作策略的演变进行了广泛的研究。通常,覆盖网络是由多个管理机构管理,由具有不同竞争利益的用户共享,甚至由独立和理性的用户自主提供的异构,动态和分布式环境。因此,整个覆盖网络的结构和对等方的合理策略一直在发展。然而,很少有方法从理论上研究网络结构与个体理性行为之间的协同进化。本文的主要动机在于:与基于EGT(进化博弈论)以经验方式说明理性策略与网络结构(通过模拟)之间相互作用的现有工作不同,我们不仅推断出可能有利于合作策略的条件缺陷策略,但在理论上也可以描述所形成网络的结构特性。具体来说,我们的贡献是双重的。首先,我们严格得出有利于合作发展的关键利益成本比(blc)。关键比率取决于网络结构(系统中对等体的数量和每个对等体的平均程度)以及演化规则(策略和关联突变概率)。然后,根据进化规则,我们正式推导了处于完全协作状态的已形成网络的结构特性。尤其是,度数分布与幂律兼容,指数为(4-3υ)/(l-3υ),其中v是同伴的连接突变概率。此外,我们表明,在不损害合作进化的前提下,进化规则的细微变化将使网络演化为小世界结构(高全局效率和平均聚类系数),并且具有与幂律分布相同的幂律度分布。原始的演化模型。

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  • 作者单位

    Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT) and Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications State Key Lab of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China;

    Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies, University of Tokyo/Network Architecture Group, NICT, Tokyo, Japan;

    Department of Computer and Telecommunications Engineering, University of Western Macedonia, Greece;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 关键词

    overlay networks; coevolution; rational strategy; structure;

    机译:覆盖网络;协同进化理性策略;结构体;

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