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The Effects of Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures on Analysts' and Nonprofessional Investors' Equity Valuation Judgments

机译:备考收益披露对分析师和非专业投资者的股权估值判断的影响

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`This paper presents an experiment that examines the effect of pro forma earnings disclosures on the judgments of analysts (i.e., more sophisticated investors) and nonprofessional (i.e., less sophisticated) investors. In the experiment, participants developed stock price assessments after reviewing background financial information and a current earnings announcement for a company. The earnings announcement was manipulated to report only GAAP earnings in one condition and both pro forma and GAAP earnings in the other condition. Consistent with empirical evidence, the pro forma earnings in our experiment exceeded GAAP earnings. The results indicate that nonprofessional investors who received an earnings announcement that contained both pro forma and GAAP disclosures assessed a higher stock price than did nonprofes-sionals who received an announcement containing only GAAP disclosures. Financial analysts' stock price judgments were not affected by the pro forma disclosures. Follow-up analyses suggest that analysts and nonprofessional investors used different valuation models and information processing. Analysts used well-defined valuation models, based on either earnings-multiples or cash flows, while the nonprofessional investors were more likely to use simpler, heuristic-based valuation models. The pro forma disclosure did not cause nonprofessional investors to assess a higher earnings number for determining a stock price, but rather caused nonprofessionals to perceive the earnings announcement as more favorable, which in turn caused them to convert earnings or some other performance metric into a higher stock price. This effect appears to be due to unintentional cognitive effects, rather than nonprofessionals relying on pro forma earnings information because they perceived it to be informative.
机译:This本文提出了一项实验,旨在检验备考收益披露对分析师(即,经验丰富的投资者)和非专业(即,经验较少的投资者)的判断的影响。在该实验中,参与者在查看公司的背景财务信息和当前收益公告后制定了股价评估。操纵收益公告的目的是仅报告一种情况下的GAAP收入,而报告另一种情况下的备考和GAAP收入。与经验证据一致,我们实验中的预估收益超过了GAAP收益。结果表明,收到既包含备考和GAAP披露的收益公告的非专业投资者的股票价格也比收到仅包含GAAP披露的公告的非专业投资者的股票价格高。财务分析师的股价判断不受备考披露的影响。后续分析表明,分析师和非专业投资者使用了不同的估值模型和信息处理。分析师使用基于收益倍数或现金流量的定义明确的估值模型,而非专业投资者则更有可能使用基于启发式的简单估值模型。备考披露并没有使非专业投资者评估较高的收益数字来确定股票价格,而是使非专业投资者认为收益公告更为有利,这反过来又导致他们将收益或其他一些绩效指标转换为较高的收益。股票价格。这种影响似乎是由于无意识的认知作用引起的,而不是非专业人士依赖备考收入信息,因为他们认为该信息是有益的。

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