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Revisiting the patriarchal bargain: The intergenerational power dynamics of household money management in rural Nepal

机译:回顾父权交易:尼泊尔农村地区家庭理财的代际权力动态

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摘要

Although power struggles between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in the South Asian household remain an enduring theme of feminist scholarship, current policy discourse on ‘women’s economic empowerment’ in the Global South tends to focus on married women’s power over their husband; this neglects intergenerational power dynamics. The aim of this study was to describe and analyze the processes involved in young, married women’s negotiations of control over cash inside the extended household in a contemporary rural Nepali setting. We conducted a grounded theory study of 42 households from the Plains of Nepal. Our study uncovered multiple ways in which junior wives and husbands in the extended household became secret allies in seeking financial autonomy from the rule of the mother-in-law to the wife. This included secretly saving up for a household separation from the in-laws. We argue these secret financial strategies constitute a means for junior couples to renegotiate the terms of Kandiyoti’s (1988) ‘patriarchal bargain’ wherein junior wives traditionally had to accept subservience to their husband and mother-in-law in exchange for economic security and eventual authority over their own daughters-in-law. Researchers, activists and policy-makers concerned with women’s economic empowerment in comparable contexts should consider the impact of intergenerational power relations on women’s control over cash.
机译:尽管南亚家庭的daughter妇和婆婆之间的权力斗争仍然是女权主义奖学金的永恒主题,但目前在全球南方有关“妇女的经济赋权”的政策论述往往侧重于已婚妇女对她们的权力丈夫;这忽略了代际力量动力。这项研究的目的是描述和分析当代尼泊尔农村地区年轻,已婚妇女在大家庭中控制现金的谈判过程。我们对来自尼泊尔平原的42户家庭进行了扎根的理论研究。我们的研究发现了大家庭中的下级妻子和丈夫成为寻求财务自主的秘密同盟的多种方式,从婆婆的统治到妻子的统治。这包括秘密地为与姻亲的家庭分居做准备。我们认为,这些秘密的财务策略构成了未成年夫妇重新协商Kandiyoti(1988)“父权交易”的条件的一种手段,在该条款中,未成年妻子传统上必须接受其丈夫和婆婆的sub养,以换取经济安全和最终的权威自己的daughter妇在可比的背景下,与赋予妇女经济权能有关的研究人员,活动家和政策制定者应考虑代际权力关系对妇女对现金的控制的影响。

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