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Emergence of Super Cooperation of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games on Scale-Free Networks

机译:无标度网络上囚徒困境游戏超级合作的出现

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摘要

Recently, the authors proposed a quantum prisoner’s dilemma game based on the spatial game of Nowak and May, and showed that the game can be played classically. By using this idea, we proposed three generalized prisoner’s dilemma (GPD, for short) games based on the weak Prisoner’s dilemma game, the full prisoner’s dilemma game and the normalized Prisoner’s dilemma game, written by GPDW, GPDF and GPDN respectively. Our games consist of two players, each of which has three strategies: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q), and have a parameter γ to measure the entangled relationship between the two players. We found that our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games have new Nash equilibrium principles, that entanglement is the principle of emergence and convergence (i.e., guaranteed emergence) of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that entanglement provides a threshold for a phase transition of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that the role of heterogeneity of the scale-free networks in cooperations and super cooperations is very limited, and that well-defined structures of scale-free networks allow coexistence of cooperators and super cooperators in the evolutions of the weak version of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games.
机译:最近,作者根据Nowak和May的空间游戏提出了一个量子囚徒困境游戏,并表明该游戏可以经典玩。利用这种想法,我们分别根据GPDW,GPDF和GPDN编写的三个弱囚犯困境游戏,完整囚犯困境游戏和规范化囚犯困境游戏,提出了三种广义的囚徒困境游戏。我们的游戏由两个参与者组成,每个参与者具有三种策略:合作者(C),叛逃者(D)和超级合作者(用Q表示),并且具有参数γ来衡量两个参与者之间的纠缠关系。我们发现,广义囚徒困境博弈具有新的纳什均衡原理,纠缠是无尺度网络上广义囚徒困境博弈演化中超级合作的出现和收敛(即保证出现)的原理,纠缠提供了一个在无标度网络上我们的广义囚徒困境游戏的发展中,超级合作阶段过渡的阈值,无标度网络的异质性在合作和超级合作中的作用非常有限,并且明确定义的规模结构自由网络允许合作者和超级合作者在我们广义囚徒困境游戏的弱版本的演变中共存。

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    Angsheng Li; Xi Yong;

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  • 年(卷),期 -1(10),2
  • 年度 -1
  • 页码 e0116429
  • 总页数 24
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