首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences >Cheating and the evolutionary stability of mutualisms.
【2h】

Cheating and the evolutionary stability of mutualisms.

机译:作弊和互惠主义的进化稳定性。

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

Interspecific mutualisms have been playing a central role in the functioning of all ecosystems since the early history of life. Yet the theory of coevolution of mutualists is virtually nonexistent, by contrast with well-developed coevolutionary theories of competition, predator-prey and host-parasite interactions. This has prevented resolution of a basic puzzle posed by mutualisms: their persistence in spite of apparent evolutionary instability. The selective advantage of 'cheating', that is, reaping mutualistic benefits while providing fewer commodities to the partner species, is commonly believed to erode a mutualistic interaction, leading to its dissolution or reciprocal extinction. However, recent empirical findings indicate that stable associations of mutualists and cheaters have existed over long evolutionary periods. Here, we show that asymmetrical competition within species for the commodities offered by mutualistic partners provides a simple and testable ecological mechanism that can account for the long-term persistence of mutualisms. Cheating, in effect, establishes a background against which better mutualists can display any competitive superiority. This can lead to the coexistence and divergence of mutualist and cheater phenotypes, as well as to the coexistence of ecologically similar, but unrelated mutualists and cheaters.
机译:自生命的早期历史以来,种间共生在所有生态系统的功能中一直发挥着核心作用。然而,与发达的竞争,捕食者-被捕食者和宿主-寄生虫相互作用的共进化论相比,互助主义者的共同进化理论实际上是不存在的。这阻止了由共生主义构成的基本难题的解决:尽管存在明显的进化不稳定,但它们仍然存在。人们普遍认为,“作弊”的选择优势,即在为伴侣物种提供更少商品的同时获得互惠互利,会侵蚀一种互惠互动,导致其解散或相互灭绝。但是,最近的经验发现表明,长期以来进化论者一直存在着互助主义者和作弊者的稳定联系。在这里,我们表明,物种内部对互惠伙伴提供的商品的不对称竞争提供了一种简单且可检验的生态机制,可以解释互惠主义的长期持久性。实际上,作弊建立了一个背景,更好的互惠者可以以此为背景展示任何竞争优势。这可能导致互惠主义者和作弊者表型的共存和分歧,以及生态相似但不相关的互惠主义者和作弊者的共存。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号