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A Game-Theoretic Framework to Preserve Location Information Privacy in Location-Based Service Applications

机译:在基于位置的服务应用程序中保留位置信息隐私的博弈论框架

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摘要

Recently, the growing ubiquity of location-based service (LBS) technology has increased the likelihood of users’ privacy breaches due to the exposure of their real-life information to untrusted third parties. Extensive use of such LBS applications allows untrusted third-party adversarial entities to collect large quantities of information regarding users’ locations over time, along with their identities. Due to the high risk of private information leakage using resource-constrained smart mobile devices, most LBS users may not be adequately encouraged to access all LBS applications. In this paper, we study the use of game theory to protect users against private information leakage in LBSs due to malicious or selfish behavior of third-party observers. In this study, we model a scenario of privacy protection gameplay between a privacy protector and an outside visitor and then derive the situation of the prisoner’s dilemma game to analyze the traditional privacy protection problems. Based on the analysis, we determine the corresponding benefits to both players using a point of view that allows the visitor to access a certain amount of information and denies further access to the user’s private information when exposure of privacy is forthcoming. Our proposed model uses the collection of private information about historical access data and current LBS access scenario to effectively determine the probability that the visitor’s access is an honest one. Moreover, we present the procedures involved in the privacy protection model and framework design, using game theory for decision-making. Finally, by employing a comparison analysis, we perform some experiments to assess the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed game-theoretic model over the traditional solutions.
机译:最近,基于位置的服务(LBS)技术日益普及,由于用户的真实信息暴露给不受信任的第三方,从而增加了用户违反隐私的可能性。此类LBS应用程序的广泛使用使不受信任的第三方对抗实体可以随时间收集有关用户位置的大量信息以及其身份。由于使用资源受限的智能移动设备造成私人信息泄漏的高风险,因此可能无法充分鼓励大多数LBS用户访问所有LBS应用程序。在本文中,我们研究了利用博弈论保护用户免受第三方观察员恶意或自私行为在LBS中泄露私人信息的影响。在这项研究中,我们对隐私保护者和外部访客之间的隐私保护游戏场景进行建模,然后得出囚徒困境游戏的情况,以分析传统的隐私保护问题。基于该分析,我们使用一种观点来确定这两个参与者的相应利益,该观点允许访问者访问一定数量的信息,并在即将暴露隐私时拒绝进一步访问用户的私人信息。我们提出的模型使用有关历史访问数据和当前LBS访问方案的私人信息的收集来有效地确定访问者的访问是诚实访问的可能性。此外,我们使用博弈论进行决策,介绍涉及隐私保护模型和框架设计的程序。最后,通过比较分析,我们进行了一些实验,以评估所提出的博弈论模型相对于传统解决方案的有效性和优越性。

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