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Testing for voter rigging in small polling stations

机译:在小型投票站测试选民索具

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摘要

Nowadays, a large number of countries combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Although in these countries the ruling elites may receive considerable voter support, they often use several manipulation tools to control election outcomes. A common practice of these regimes is the coercion and mobilization of large numbers of voters. This electoral irregularity is known as voter rigging, distinguishing it from vote rigging, which involves ballot stuffing or stealing. We develop a statistical test to quantify the extent to which the results of a particular election display traces of voter rigging. Our key hypothesis is that small polling stations are more susceptible to voter rigging because it is easier to identify opposing individuals, there are fewer eyewitnesses, and interested parties might reasonably expect fewer visits from election observers. We devise a general statistical method for testing whether voting behavior in small polling stations is significantly different from the behavior in their neighbor stations in a way that is consistent with the widespread occurrence of voter rigging. On the basis of a comparative analysis, the method enables third parties to conclude that an explanation other than simple variability is needed to explain geographic heterogeneities in vote preferences. We analyze 21 elections in 10 countries and find significant statistical anomalies compatible with voter rigging in Russia from 2007 to 2011, in Venezuela from 2006 to 2013, and in Uganda in 2011. Particularly disturbing is the case of Venezuela, where the smallest polling stations were decisive to the outcome of the 2013 presidential elections.
机译:如今,许多国家都将正式的民主制度与独裁做法结合起来。尽管在这些国家,统治精英可能会得到选民的大力支持,但他们经常使用几种操纵工具来控制选举结果。这些政权的一种普遍做法是强迫和动员大量选民。这种选举违规行为被称为选民操纵,将其与涉及选票填塞或偷窃的选票操纵区别开来。我们开发了一项统计测试,以量化特定选举结果显示选民操纵痕迹的程度。我们的主要假设是,小型投票站更容易受到选民的操纵,因为它更容易识别反对者,目击者较少,并且有关方面可能会合理地期望选举观察员的到访会更少。我们设计了一种通用的统计方法,用于测试小型投票站的投票行为是否与相邻投票站的行为显着不同,其方式与选民操纵的普遍发生相一致。在比较分析的基础上,该方法使第三方可以得出结论,需要简单的可变性以外的其他解释来解释投票偏好中的地理异质性。我们分析了10个国家/地区的21次选举,发现与2007年至2011年在俄罗斯,2006年至2013年在委内瑞拉以及2011年在乌干达的选民操纵相匹配的重大统计异常。特别令人不安的是委内瑞拉,那里的投票站最少对2013年总统大选的结果具有决定性意义。

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