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环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计

     

摘要

在环境治理中,中央政府和地方政府作为“经济人”为争取自身利益最大化展开竞争博弈,效用目标差异是导致其竞争的根本原因。为实现双方互利共赢的帕累托最优,应设计相应的激励机制以实现地方政府从竞争走向合作,实现地方利益与区域利益的统一,经济增长和环境协调一致,促进社会可持续发展。%In environmental governance,the central government and the local government ac-ted as an"economic man"for the maximization of their own interests to compete in the game.U-tility goal difference is the fundamental cause of its competition.In order to achieve a win-win as the Pareto optimum,we design a corresponding incentive mechanism to realize the local gov-ernment from competition to cooperation,the unity of local interests and regional interests,coor-dination of economic growth and the environment,and promote the sustainable development of society.

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