基于“囚徒困境”博弈的防范工程招投标合谋研究

摘要

提出一种防范工程招投标中招标代理与投标人合谋的新策略,即同时派出两个招标代理审查投标人,使两个招标代理陷入“囚徒困境”博弈中以保证其报告真实.进而针对该策略成本太高的缺点,通过使两者处于不对称信息环境下,进一步改进了该“囚徒困境”博弈.据此,只要招标人设定适当的奖励和惩罚机制,就能在一定程度上阻止招标代理与投标人合谋.%This paper proposes a new strategy to prevent the collusion between the bidding agent and the tenderer in project bidding and tendering,namely sends two bidding agents to review the tenderer at the same time,and lets them fall into prisoner's dilemma game in order to make sure that they report truly.Furthermore,according to the disadvantage of high cost of this strategy,it improves this prisoner's dilemma game through making them be in asymmetric information environment.In this case,as long as the bidder sets proper reward and punishment mechanism,the problem of the collusion between the bidding agent and the tenderer to a certain extent could be solved.