城市工业园区存量更新中的利益博弈与治理创新*--深圳、常州高新区两种模式的比较

摘要

With the transformation of national economy and the adjustment of industrial structure, the development of urban industrial parks in China has gradually stepped into the era of exploiting inventory potential under the background of increasingly strict land control, thus producing large numbers of industrial land regeneration activities. As the combined logic of capital and power is behind physical space, continuous gaming concentrating on space is also behind land redevelopment, the key and dififculty point of which is to balance rights and interests of stakeholders. However, in the current institutional environment, redevelopment gaming is often restricted by property right system and gaming imbalance, redevelopment work facing the lose-lose dilemma. Starting from the basic mechanisms of spatial gaming, the in-depth contradictions hindering the inventory redevelopment of urban industrial parks is discussed in this study. An ideal gaming model based on value equilibrium is constructed to speciifcally analyze two governance modes ofShenzhen and Changzhounationalhigh-tech zones and then point out the main problems as well as future institutional innovation orientation. The study shows that the inventory redevelopment of urban industrial land is cooperative spatial gaming in essence, ownership adjustment and balanced value distribution of which are the key to reaching cooperative agreement and realizing gaming equilibrium. For urban industrial parks in general areas, policy system suitable for industrial land redevelopment and positively-involved catalytic projects can be carried out to achieve the decrease of transaction cost and the improvement of.%伴随国民经济转型和产业结构调整，在土地管制日益严格的背景下，城市工业园区的发展逐步进入存量挖潜时代，并引发了大量的工业用地更新活动。正如物质空间的背后是资本与权力交织的逻辑，用地更新的背后是围绕着空间的不断博弈，其关键和难点在于平衡利益相关者间的权力和权益。然而在现有制度环境中，更新博弈往往受限于产权制度和博弈失衡，更新工作也面临着多输的困境。从空间博弈的基本机制出发，探讨阻碍城市工业园区存量更新的深层次矛盾，构建基于价值均衡的理想博弈模型，并具体分析深圳和常州高新区两种治理模式，指出其主要问题和未来的制度创新方向。城市工业园区存量更新本质上是一种合作空间博弈，权属调整与价值分配的均衡是达成合作协议实现博弈均衡的关键。对于一般性地区的城市工业园区而言，通过构建适用于工业用地更新的政策体系与主动介入的触媒式项目，可以实现交易成本的下降与合作剩余的提高。