In this paper, we study the cooperation be-tween the carriers in shipping industry based on evolutionary game model. It is proved that the carriers have inefficient behav-ior without the supervision mechanism. There is equilibrium which is cooperation versus non-cooperation between the carriers in high season of transportation, while there is equilibrium of non-cooperation versus non-cooperation between the carriers in low season of transportation. However, the cooperation equilib-rium will be formed by the establishment of the supervision mechanism. The conclusion of this paper is important and useful to the operation of shipping industry.%本文运用演化博弈理论研究了航运业中承运人群体之间的合作行为.研究表明,当没有监控机制存在时,航运业承运人群体之间的合作将是无效的.在航运旺季时,承运人之间存在合作和不合作的演化均衡,在航运淡季时,承运人之间出现双方都不合作的演化均衡.然而,当航运区域的枢纽港充当监控平台时,在航运旺季和航运淡季时,对承运人群体合作和背叛行为给与不同范围的激励和补偿,将使承运人之间出现高效的合作演化均衡.研究结果对区域航运业有一定的借鉴作用.
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