节能减排技术研发的补贴和合作政策比较

摘要

Two technology incentive policies,that are subsidies and cooperation,are put to use in technology R&D of ener-gy saving and emission reduction which includes production engineering R&D and pollution emission reduction R&D under the condition of exogenous emission tax. A game model of mutual action between government and firms is built to compare R&D,profit and social welfare. It can be found that:①When spillover rate of production engineering R&D is low,the lev-el of production engineering R&D under subsidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy;when spillover rate of pro-duction engineering R&D is high,the level of production engineering R&D under cooperation policy is higher than under subsidies policy.②When discharge rate is less than critical rate,the level of pollution emission reduction R&D under sub-sidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy;When discharge rate is higher than critical rate,the level of pollution emission reduction R&D under cooperation policy is higher than under subsidies policy. The research result will provide theory support for government to choose correct technology incentive policy and for firms to choose correct R&D behavior.%在外生的排放税的条件下，将补贴和合作两种技术激励政策分别应用在节能减排技术研发即生产工艺研发和污染减排研发上。通过建立政府和企业之间的互动博弈模型，分析比较两种政策下的研发水平、利润和社会福利。研究发现：（1）当生产工艺研发溢出率较低时，补贴政策下的生产工艺研发水平高于合作政策下的生产工艺研发水平；当生产工艺研发溢出率较高时，刚好相反。（2）当排放税率小于临界税率，补贴政策下的污染减排研发水平高于合作政策下的污染减排研发水平；当排放税率大于临界税率，结论相反。研究结果为政府选择正确的技术激励政策、企业选择正确的研发行为提供有力的理论支撑。