Dissecting Cohen

         

摘要

Readers of The New England Journal of Medicine may be excused for thinking that there is a good case for, and nogood case against, the use of animals in biomedical research. In October 1986, philosopher Carl Cohen, who is knownfor his principled positions on affirmative action and other issues, published an article in that journal in which heclaimed that there are (only) two kinds of argument against the use of animals in biomedical research. After examiningboth arguments, Cohen concluded that they “deserve definitive dismissal.” In this article, I show that both of Cohen’sattempted refutations fail. Not only has he not laid a glove on the arguments in question;his discussion betrays afundamental misunderstanding of the arguments that he so cavalierly dismisses. Readers of Cohen’s article owe it tothemselves—and, more importantly, to the animals whose use as research subjects Cohen defends—to take anotherlook at the issue.

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