知识创造行为与组织惯例的演化博弈及其仿真研究

摘要

Taking evolutionary game model as the main theoretical instrument, this paper constructs the evolution-ary game mode of knowledge creation behavior and organizational routines based on the description of the rela-tionship between knowledge creation behavior and organizational routines.With giving solutions to the replication dynamic equation, we analyze the strategies of knowledge creation behavior and organizational routines reaching evolutionary stable equilibria under different situations.Our results show that, the matching of knowledge crea-tion behavior and organizational routines is a dynamic and repeating process of game.Expected income, incen-tive cost and switching cost involved in the game will directly affect the evolutionary stable equilibrium, as well as the choices of individuals on knowledge creation behavior and organizational routines.However, organizational knowledge creation behavior tends to choose the conservative strategy which mainly focuses on inheriting.The utilization of evolutionary game approach will open up a brand-new perspective for the study of knowledge crea-tion behavior and organization routines, and also provide helpful theoretical support for further exploration into relevant areas.%以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具，在对知识创造行为与组织惯例关系予以描述的基础上，构建知识创造行为与组织惯例的演化博弈模型。通过求解复制动态方程，分析不同条件下知识创造行为与组织惯例分别达到演化稳定均衡的策略。研究结果表明：知识创造行为与组织惯例的匹配属于动态、重复博弈过程，参与博弈的预期收益、激励成本、转换成本直接决定演化稳定策略且影响个体对知识创造行为与组织惯例的选择，知识创造行为则倾向以承袭为主的保守策略。演化博弈方法的引入为知识创造行为和组织惯例的研究开辟了全新视角，也为相关领域的进一步探索提供有利的理论支持。