可再生能源价格政策在寡头竞争市场中的比较

摘要

在考虑可再生能源发电间歇性和电力企业两阶段决策过程的前提下,建立了度电补贴和配额制政策下的电力市场寡头垄断竞争模型并进行了分析.以以色列电力市场的数据进行数值实验,分析了电力企业数量、补贴价格、可再生能源电力配额、投资费用等关键因素对发电容量投资的影响.考虑到政策的福利效应,比较了度电补贴和配额制政策下电力价格、消费者剩余和社会福利的差异.%The premium Feed-in Tariff(FIT)and Renewable Portfolio Standard(RPS)policy provide investors with incentive to participate in the renewable power production.Based on the intermittency of renewable power and a two-stage decision process of generators,we develop an oligopolistic competition model and apply the game theory to get the equilibrium of the power market.With the data of Israel''s power market,we analyze the impact of the number of generators,subsidy price,the proportion of renewable power and the investment cost of renewable technology on the capacity investment of the power market.Considering the welfare effect of the premium FIT and RPS,we compare the electricity price,consumer surplus and social welfare with these two policies.