碳交易机制下地方政府与发电企业的演化博弈分析

摘要

Based on evolutionary game theory,a game model between local governments and power generation enterprises was constructed,and then the dynamic stability and evolution trend were analyzed.The analysis result suggests that there exist some different equilibria in the evolution of the game system when the expected profits of enterprises are changing.Accordingly,local governments need to take some measures,for example,strengthening incentives to enterprises who actively abide by emission reduction polices,increasing carbon trading prices appropriately,reducing the variance of cost when local governments choose strict regulation or loose regulation,and strengthening public supervision of the governments,so as to urge the power generation enterprises to consciously reduce carbon emissions,thus achieving control over the overall carbon emissions.%基于演化博弈理论,构建了地方政府和发电企业之间的博弈模型,分析了两者之间的复制动态和演化稳定趋势.研究表明,当企业超额排放预期增加收益发生变化时,此博弈系统的演化会出现多种不同的均衡.为此,地方政府需要采取加大对积极遵守碳约束减排企业的激励、适当提高碳市场碳交易价格、降低地方政府监管严格与宽松时的成本差、加强民众对政府的监督等措施,来督促引导发电企业自觉减排,从而实现社会碳排放总量的控制目标.