In the real economy, competition and cooperation are widespread in a variety of industries, between enterprises, and even regions, countries, and even local governments etc. An example between enterprises is information sharing and production decision-making game between Duopoly enterprises in the case of information spillover. Whether static (Cournot model) or dynamic (Stackelberg model) production decision-making situations, each firm's profits, consumer's welfare and then the social welfare will be increased after they share their information. However, a "Prisoner's Dilemma" exists in the information sharing and production decision-making game between Duopoly enterprises. Actual results are often both sides of the two enterprises to reduce or even don't give each other information. This is the inevitable result of rational decision-making of the duopoly from the each point view of maxi-mizing their own interests. However, respective decision-making from the individual rationality does not bring the final maximization of their own interests. The fact is just the opposite, the two sides fall into the dilemma. The contradiction of individual rationality and collective rationality, namely "Waste of efforts", is the results of the non-cooperation and competition. Only cooperation and to strengthen the parties supervision, and finally formatting an effective system of equilibrium in the cooperation process, then can out of the woods to avoid wasting.% 现实经济中，竞争与合作都广泛存在于各种行业内、企业间，甚至地区及国家间、地方政府间等。企业中在信息外溢情况下，双寡头企业间信息共享与产量决策博弈时，无论静态（古诺模型）还是动态（斯坦克尔伯格模型）的产量决策情形，双寡头在信息共享后，每个企业自身利润以及消费者福利与社会福利都会得到增加。但是在信息共享中存在“囚徒困境”，实际结果往往是双方都减少甚至不给予对方信息，这是双寡头各自从自身利益最大化角度出发进行理性决策的必然结果。然而，出自个体理性的各自决策并未带来最终各自利益的最大化，结果恰好相反，双方陷入了困境。个人理性与集体理性的矛盾，即“努力的浪费”，是非合作竞争结果，分析表明只有博弈双方进行合作并加强各方监督，并且最终在合作过程中形成有效制度均衡，才能走出困境避免浪费。
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