Based on the risk-sharing contract model between the insurer and the small and medium-sized S&T enterprise(Tech SME), this article analyzes the dynamic incentive mechanism that should be taken by the insurance company when moral hazard and adverse selection exist in Tech SME at the same time. This paper discusses two-stages dynamic game exists in risk sharing by the game and prin-cipal-agent theory. Then the insurer can predict the loss distribution of next year according to the default frequency occurs in one year, and can judge optimal effort level of the Tech SME, then can decide whether to continue the loans or the next premium. The insurance companies and banks could reduce the information asymmetry between the financial institutions and the Tech SME, and also could identify clearly the risk status of the enterprise by monitoring internal data and external data of the Tech SME such as history management data, tax records, as well as customer feedback, which could provide data support to make different premium rate and the amount of loans for the financial institutions. It could provide further theoretical foundation for the insurer who designs the reasonable incentive contract.%文章基于保险公司与科技型中小企业之间的风险分担博弈模型，对科技型中小企业同时存在道德风险和逆向选择时，保险公司所要采取的动态激励进行了分析研究。通过博弈论和委托—代理理论，讨论了存在两阶段动态博弈时，保险公司可以通过观察第一年内的违约频率来估计未来承保期可能的损失，并判断科技型中小企业采取的最优努力水平，以决定是否继续发放贷款以及后一阶段的保费。保险公司和银行可以通过监控科技型中小企业的历史经营数据等内部数据以及纳税记录、客户反馈等外部数据，以改善金融机构与科技型中小企业间信息不对称的格局，清晰地甄别出企业的风险状况，为制定差异化保险费率和发放贷款数额提供数据支持。该研究对保险公司制定费率有一定的理论意义。
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