供应商技术研发决策的演化博弈分析

摘要

This paper builds an evolutionary game model in different situations, and studies the R&D decisions of suppliers who are facing the dilemma of adopting generic or specific technology. The results show that the different R&D strategy pooling becomes the evolutionary stable strategy of game system led by the externality of generic technology. Depending on the strength of the externality of generic technology, the transformation difficulty of generic technology has opposite effect on the R&D strategy selection of suppliers. The technology and subsidies support of government are conducive to ease the negative impact of the technical transformation difficulty and the generic technology externalities, and motivates suppliers develop generic technology, and the government technology support can produce greater incentives to make generic technology R&D decisions.%供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术？运用演化博弈论，对供应商的这一决策问题进行分析。研究发现：共性技术外部性使博弈演化稳定于选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡；根据共性技术外部性的强弱，共性技术转化难度对供应商技术研发策略的选择产生相反的影响；政府对共性技术的技术和补贴支持均利于缓解共性技术外部性和技术转化难度的不利影响，激励供应商研发共性技术，而政府技术支持能更好地激励供应商做出共性技术研发的决策。