首页> 中文期刊> 《贵州财经大学学报》 >缴费激励机制下的养老金连年上调:矛盾及其化解

缴费激励机制下的养老金连年上调:矛盾及其化解

         

摘要

通过测算不同缴费年限、缴费基数和退休年龄下的养老金交叉替代率,发现现行养老金制度具有较强的缴费激励效应;而早退休、早调待、少缴费的养老金水平明显高于晚退休、晚调待、多缴费的养老金水平。这种养老金调整方式与养老保险制度本身“多工作、多缴费、多得养老金”的缴费激励机制相矛盾,它将打击职工长缴、多缴的积极性,不利于制度的可持续发展。由此提出,建立正常的养老金调整机制,扩大调整范围,加快实现养老保险制度并轨,提高基本养老保险最低缴费年限。%The state increases basic pension by the proportion of 10% for enterprise retirees between 2005—2014,which increases the income of retirees from enterprises to some extent and is conducive to narrow the income gap with the authorities and institutions among retirees.By constructing models,this paper measures cross -replacement rate under different levels of contribution years,payment cardinality and retirement age.By comparing with the pension level under current adjustments,it is found that the current pension system has stronger payment incentive effects.It can also be learned that the pension level from early retirement,early adjustment and less payment is obviously higher than that from later retirement,later adjustment and more payment .That is to say this adjustment method is contradictory with the payment incentives of system itself"more work more pay and more pensions”,which will blow the enthusiasm of workers to pay and pay more and is not conducive to the sustainable development of the system.Therefore,it is proposed to establish the normal pension adjustment mechanism,achieve unification of endowment insurance system,and expand the adjustment range and to rise the minimum basic contribution years of pension insurance and so on.

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