基于演化博弈的应急物资生产能力储备策略

摘要

With the target of maximizing time efficiency and minimizing disaster loss, emergency supplies focus on the cooperation of emergency capacity reserve between government and enterprise.Under three different conditions ( without any measures, punishment, punishment and subsidies in parallel) , an evolu-tionary game analysis is conducted in terms of emergency productivity reserve between the government and the enterprises.Analysis shows that under certain conditions, the government′s inspection cost, regular or irregular, government′s subsidies and punishment, are the key factors that influence the cooperation of both sides.And through a numerical example to validate the conclusion, the emergency productivity re-serve strategy is analyzed.%研究政府和企业共同储备应急物资生产能力的合作问题,就3种不同条件(无任何措施、惩罚、惩罚和补贴并行)政府和协议企业之间在应急物资生产能力的共同储备进行演化博弈分析. 分析表明:在一定条件下,企业储备的收益和成本,政府定期或不定期检查的成本、政府奖惩力度等是影响双方合作的关键因素. 通过算例对所得结论进行验证,最后给出应急物资生产能力储备的策略建议.