内部市场还是集权管理？--某国有集团企业资金集中管理案例研究

摘要

In this article we propose that centralized cash management is more likely to be a means of centralized management than to be a form of spontaneous internal market. By modeling the decision-making mechanism of the centralization of corporate cash management, we find that, because of the gaming among the subsidiaries within a group corporation, they lack the motivation to spontaneously centralize their cash management, and that when the group corporation dominates the centralization of cash management, a rational decision should weigh the decreased financing cost against the increased administration cost. Financing cost can be saved by lower combined interest rate and less borrowing, but implementing centralized cash management may take extra administration cost. Our case analysis is consistent with the judgments above. Additionally, we find that centralized cash management may increase financial risk, and that it can be complementary to other means of centralized management such as centralized procurement.%本文提出，资金集中管理更可能是一种集权式的管理手段，而非自发形成的内部资本市场的表现形式。本文构建模型分析了影响企业资金集中管理决策的机制，发现由于内部博弈的存在，集团企业中的子企业没有动机自发地进行资金集中管理。如果由集团利用集权的方法主导实施资金集中管理，那么合理的资金集中管理决策是权衡减少融资成本和增加管理成本的结果。资金集中管理通过更低的联合融资利率和更低的融资额减少融资成本，却会增加管理成本。本文的案例分析结果与以上判断吻合。同时案例分析还发现：资金集中管理可能会对企业带来额外的财务风险，资金集中管理可以和其他集权管控手段（如集中采购）形成互补。