EVA Assessment,Discipline Constraints of CPC and SOEs’Inefficient Investment:Evidence From Listed Companies in Chinese A-Share Owned by Chinese Central Government

摘要

Based on the Richard Model in 2006,the author classify the Chinese Central Government-Owned Companies(CGOCs),which show the typical characteristics of State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs),by their state of investing into the sample of Over-Investment(OI)or Under-Investment(UI),then empirically testify how the assessment based on Economic Value-added(EVA)by Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC),and the Discipline Constraints(DCs)of the Communist Party of China(CPC)affect the state of Inefficient Investment(II).The author’s empirical results include those as following:(1)The EVA assessment has significant effect of restraining CGOCs’OI,but the effect is not significant for UI;(2)The DCs show no significant effect of suppressing OI,but significant effect of worsening UI;(3)As far as the moderating effect is concerned,DCs only in a small degree strengthen the function of EVA assessment for suppressing CGOCs’OI,but significantly weaken its function of relieving CGOCs’UI.Based on these empirical proofs,the author proposes that the emphasis of the EVA assessment and DCs should be synergistically shifted to CGOCs’UI,which has important institutional meanings especially under the background of macro-economic going down for a long time.