首页> 外文期刊>中国会计学刊:英文版 >“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market
【24h】

“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market

机译:“游泳鸭子预测春天的到来” —内幕交易总量对中国市场未来收益的可预测性

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive(large shareholder)trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66%(72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage(e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,probably because the "quasi-official" status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading.The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.
机译:这项研究系统地检查了总内幕交易预测中国A股市场未来市场收益的能力。在控制了逆向投资策略之后,过去六个月进行的高管人员(大股东)交易可以提前12个月预测66%(72.7%)的市场回报。内幕交易的总和可以非常准确地预测未来市场的回报,对于拥有更大信息优势的内幕人士(例如高管和控股股东)而言,内幕交易的表现更强。公司治理也影响内幕交易的可预测性。中央国有企业中高管人员交易的可预测性最弱,这可能是因为这些公司中高管人员的“准官方”身份有效地抑制了他们从内幕交易中获利的动力。公司比国有公司要高,这可能是由于它们具有更强的利润动机和更高的业务参与度。本研究通过研究新兴市场并调查制度背景和公司治理如何影响内幕交易来补充文献。

著录项

获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号