村干部“谋利型代理人”角色及其行为逻辑——以西北龙村退耕还林（还草）事件为例

摘要

村干部角色是一个重要研究课题。通过对西北龙村退耕还林（还草）＂过程—事件＂的分析,发现实践中村干部不仅是国家和村民的代理人,而且是特殊关系网络的代言人,在具体事件中他们更多地从个人利益出发扮演代理人角色,行为呈现谋利化趋向,作者试图用＂谋利型代理人＂这一表述概括之。乡村政治格局下村干部角色错位、行为变异是多种因素共同作用的结果,其基本逻辑是村干部个人利益最大化。村干部的行为模式包括政府利益模式、村民利益模式和个人利益模式,但对村干部最具影响的是贯穿于整个行为过程中的个人利益模式。%The role of village cadres is an important topic for research.Through the rehabilitation of plough to forest（grassland）in Long Village,Northwest China,we find that village cadres are not only agents of the country and villagers,but also the spokesman of the special network in practice,playing a role more personally in the specific case because of personal interest.Village cadres＇ roles are imbalanced and their behaviors are trending to profit,being ＂profit-based agent＂ in their jobs.In the politics of countryside,the imbalanced roles and unusual behaviors of village cadres are resulted from many factors,the basic logic of which is maximizing individual interests.The behavior patterns of village cadres include government benefits mode,villager benefits mode and personal interest mode,personal interest mode for village cadres being the fundamental one throughout their working process.