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Technology investments in supply chains: Impact of new entry, competition, and interventions.

机译:供应链中的技术投资:新进入,竞争和干预的影响。

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摘要

In today's competitive business environment, companies have to make various investment decisions to move forward or sometimes just to function in the marketplace. The return of an investment, the effect of external market factors on an investment decision and ways to encourage an investment, the impact of an investment's timing and magnitude on a firm's performance represent the core issues surrounding an investment decision. In this thesis, we address each of these investment questions with different settings.; In Chapter 2, we quantify the return of investment in a new technology. We demonstrate how inventory visibility helps reduce a manufacturer's inventory cost on the coordination of his reverse and forward channel. We consider a single manufacturer who meets the end customer demand with recently produced products (forward channel) as well as returned items. We quantify the value of information/visibility on the reverse channel for the manufacturer by making comparisons between three approaches: naive approach where the manufacturer has no visibility on his reverse channel and does not pay attention to the return flow characteristics; enlightened approach where the manufacturer has no visibility but takes the return flow into account while making his production planning; and full visibility where the manufacturer can monitor the arrival of returned items to the system and adjust his inventory level expectations for the following periods based on his observations. Under such a setting, we characterize how the supply chain characteristics of the manufacturer (visibility versus no visibility) and the type of management (naive versus enlightened) affect the value of visibility. We also evaluate the performance of practical approximations in inventory planning and find that the manufacturer may still invest for visibility and enjoy a majority of the savings with practical inventory planning rules. The value of visibility that we find here also translates into the visibility savings of an enabler technology and provides guidance on the investment decision for such a technology. A candidate enabler in this setting is RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology, adoption of which is recently being discussed in industry.; In Chapter 3, we focus on the effect of external market factors such as positive network externalities among firms and scale economies in the technology's supply on an investment decision, and discuss ways to foster investment. Faced with a new technology introduced in a market, a firm has to account for uncertainties regarding the future of the technology, network effects, and steep startup costs while making the adoption decision. Thus, each firm may be reluctant to be the first to invest due to the risk of being stranded with the investment. The vendor of the new technology, however, still experiencing economies of scale in the technology production, cannot provide assurance and lower prices unless some firms get on board with the technology. This individualistic behavior of firms produces a chicken-and-egg problem where the vendor and potential adopters both need encouragement from the other side but cannot completely commit. We study this adoption problem by finding the inefficiency, i.e., the adoption gap, due to lack of coordination. We propose several intervention methods such as subsidies, mandates, and quantity discounts to improve the adoption process. We evaluate each method's performance depending on the market characteristics, and discuss when each method is preferable. Finally, we compare our findings with our observations on the RFID market and its adoption.; In Chapter 4, we study the role of investment, specifically quality investment, in competition between two firms. We first consider a monopolist challenged by an entrant. We discuss how quality investment may keep the potential entrant out of the market. We characterize the market conditions motivating the monopolist to blockade, deter
机译:在当今竞争激烈的商业环境中,公司必须做出各种投资决策以前进,有时甚至只是为了在市场中发挥作用。投资的回报,外部市场因素对投资决策的影响以及鼓励投资的方式,投资时机和规模对公司绩效的影响都是围绕投资决策的核心问题。在本文中,我们以不同的设置解决了每个投资问题。在第二章中,我们量化了一项新技术的投资回报。我们演示了库存可视性如何通过协调制造商的反向和正向渠道来帮助降低其库存成本。我们考虑一个可以满足最终客户需求的单一制造商,他们可以提供最近生产的产品(前进渠道)以及退货。我们通过三种方法之间的比较来量化制造商在反向渠道上的信息/可见性的价值:天真方法,即制造商在其反向渠道上没有可见性并且不关注回流特性;开明的方法,其中制造商不可见,但在制定生产计划时要考虑回流。全面的可见性,制造商可以在其中监视退回物料到达系统的状态,并根据自己的观察在接下来的时间段内调整其库存水平期望值。在这样的背景下,我们描述了制造商的供应链特征(可见性与无可见性)以及管理类型(幼稚与开明)如何影响可见性的价值。我们还评估了库存计划中实际近似值的性能,发现制造商可能仍会为可见性进行投资,并通过实际的库存计划规则享受大部分节省。我们在此处发现的可见性的价值还可以转化为节省使能技术的可见性,并为此类技术的投资决策提供指导。在这种情况下,候选的推动者是RFID(射频识别)技术,最近业界正在讨论采用这种技术。在第三章中,我们着重于外部市场因素的影响,例如企业之间积极的网络外部性以及技术供应中的规模经济对投资决策的影响,并讨论了促进投资的方法。面对市场上引入的新技术,公司必须在做出采用决策时考虑到有关技术的未来,网络效应和过高的启动成本的不确定性。因此,由于存在被投资搁浅的风险,每个公司可能都不愿意第一个进行投资。但是,除非某些公司加入该技术,否则新技术的供应商仍会在技术生产中经历规模经济,因此无法提供保证和降低价格。企业的这种个人主义行为产生了一个鸡与蛋的问题,其中卖方和潜在采用者都需要对方的鼓励,但却无法完全做出承诺。我们通过发现效率低下(即由于缺乏协调而导致的采用差距)来研究这种采用问题。我们提出了几种干预方法,例如补贴,授权和数量折扣,以改善采用过程。我们根据市场特点评估每种方法的性能,并讨论每种方法何时更可取。最后,我们将我们的发现与我们对RFID市场及其应用的观察结果进行比较。在第四章中,我们研究了投资(尤其是优质投资)在两家公司之间的竞争中的作用。我们首先考虑一个被进入者挑战的垄断者。我们讨论高质量的投资如何将潜在进入者拒之门外。我们描述了促使垄断者封锁,阻止的市场条件

著录项

  • 作者

    Karaer, Ozgen.;

  • 作者单位

    Stanford University.;

  • 授予单位 Stanford University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.; Engineering Industrial.; Operations Research.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2008
  • 页码 162 p.
  • 总页数 162
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;一般工业技术;运筹学;
  • 关键词

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