Coordination, reflection, and exclusion: Three problems of mental causation.

摘要

In the dissertation I consider three separate but related problems of mental causation.;In Part 1 of the dissertation, I introduce what I call The Coordination Problem. The problem asks, in a nutshell: what explains why it is that, to the extent that mental states (in particular, propositional attitudes) cause behavior, they tend to cause the very behaviors that they also rationalize i.e. that they also provide reasons for? I then consider several different ways of trying to answer this problem, including an appeal to functionalism and interpretationism about the nature of propositional attitudes, evolution by natural selection, and a Davidsonian account of the nature of intentional action. I argue that none of these approaches provides a satisfying answer to the coordination problem. Thus, at the end of the day, the coordination problem stands as a live and important challenge in the philosophy of mind.;In Part 2, I introduce what I call The Reflection Problem. This problem asks, in a nutshell, what explains why it is that harmful bodily events (e.g. damage and deprivation) tend to give rise to unpleasant sensations, while beneficial bodily events (e.g. receiving sufficient nutrients and warmth) tend to give rise to pleasant sensations? I then consider three different ways of answering this question. Specifically, I consider appeals to evolution by natural selection, to a functionalist account of the nature of qualitative sensations, and to a reductive account of pleasantness and unpleasantness. I argue that, of these three approaches, only the last one can potentially provide a satisfying answer to the reflection problem.;In Part 3 of the dissertation. I address, by way of contrast to the coordination problem and the reflection problem, a more traditional problem of mental causation. It asks, in essence, how mental states can avoid having their causal powers vis-a-vis physical behaviors pre-empted by the physical causes of those same behaviors. I answer the problem by arguing that physical behaviors, one and all, have two distinct, sufficient causes---a mental cause and a physical cause.