The dictator's dilemma: Rule-of-law reforms in the Middle East and North Africa, 1960--2005.

摘要

Since the 1970s, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been enacting rule-of-law reforms---political and institutional changes codified legally---with greater frequency, despite the uncertainty and moderate risk reforms introduce. Autocrats in the region reform even as they maintain their rule through traditional mechanisms, such as repression and economic pay-offs. This dissertation asks: How do those autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa that enact rule-of-law reforms choose the substance of their reforms? What explains the varied consequences of similar substantive types of reforms?;The dissertation argues that a MENA autocrat will use a rule-of-law reform to confront the particularities of his opposition. He thus chooses the particular substance of the reform based on the characteristics of the opposition, in particular whether the opposition is united or divided; whether it is entirely secular or includes secular and non-secular factions; and whether there are international as well as domestic opponents.;The dissertation begins by creating a data set of every rule-of-law reform enacted by 18 authoritarian regimes that have ruled in the Middle East and North Africa since 1960. After drawing inferential observations about reform trends from this large-N data, the dissertation selects three understudied substantive types of reforms frequently enacted among the set of regimes: constitutional revisions; women's rights reforms; and changes to prisoner detention regulations. The comparative case studies based on field research in Bahrain, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Morocco find moderate support for the following hypotheses: First, constitutional revisions are more likely to fragment autocratic power when the autocrat confronts a political or economic crisis and a strong political opposition. Second, women's rights reforms are more likely to divide secular and non-secular opposition factions and co-opt the secular opponents when the secular opponents are already the weaker of the two factions. The gender card is not as useful to the autocrat as a wedge issue when the secular and non-secular factions are equally matched. Finally, when domestic and international actors sustain an allied human rights campaign, short-term prisoner detention reforms are more likely to yield continued human rights improvements. The case studies suggest that autocrats pick the substance of the reform based on their best guess of its strategic benefits, but sometimes they miscalculate and unintended effects of their reforms materialize.;Two conclusions from this dissertation are relevant to policymakers interested in promoting reform in the region. First, rule-of-law reforms are commonly triggered by domestic factors, rather than international pressures. Second, when international actors support rule-of-law reforms chosen by the autocrat, they are often sustaining the autocrat's own strategies. The dissertation concludes by outlining new directions for theorizing about autocratic governance in MENA regimes and beyond.