Finding Democracy in Authoritarian Elections: Strategies for Mobilizing and Rewarding Russian Voters

摘要

This study contributes to the growing scholarly literature on elections in authoritarian political systems. Much is known about the correlation between distributive politics and government spending in democratic systems, where the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of voters can be immediately evinced and consequential for elected officials. But the dynamics of voter mobilization, political motivations and accountability are shaded in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian systems, where true political contests are inhibited by the state---and the measure of victory is legitimacy and credibility of the ruling regime accrued via high turnout for elections that are managed for the continuity of incumbents. Nonetheless, this study argues that elections and voters matter in Russia, a semi-authoritarian regime with a diverse election schema ranging from the purely local to national elections. Collection and analysis of federal expenditures shows dynamics of political signaling at points throughout election cycles, with officials making strategic allocations of the public goods intended to positively influence voter turnout. This study finds evidence of voter-elite connection and performance-based accountability within Russian politics, which can be viewed as democratic aspects with the authoritarian system.;My study engages qualitative evidence that demonstrates that under the conditions of federalism and semi-presidentialism, featured by a strong presidential position, elections ultimately represent a referendum on the president and his party. The regime's performance in the legislative elections is closely linked with the presidential popularity and performance. Loss of support among the electorate diminishes the legitimacy of political authority. The Kremlin pursues strategic goals of fostering strong turnout and apparent public support to create an aura of invincibility. Potential vulnerabilities stem from the economy and institutional design, in particular within the electoral system. Voter mobilization through federal allocations to regions is an important characteristic of electoral strategy in Russian politics.;The empirical analysis demonstrates the regime overspends on presidential elections. The analysis shows inefficiencies induced by the need for overwhelming turnout and overwhelming majorities. Numerous reforms that have re-designed electoral system and the center-regional relations led to the consolidation of power in the Kremlin. On the other hand, these centralized tendencies have exposed the president to an unexpected mass-based vulnerability, with voters assigning responsibility for their well-being to the executive. Dominance in the political hierarchy could be a liability, and hence overspending bears economic costs but increases political benefits.;Overall the study illustrates that potential threats from the masses during elections are a matter of concern for the ruling elite. This points out to a kind of unexpected mass-level 'democratic' feature that arises out of greater autocratic control at the elite level.