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Three essays on buyer power theory, dominant HMOs and technology transfer.

机译:关于买方权力理论,主导型HMO和技术转让的三篇论文。

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The following are abstracts of the three chapters of my doctoral dissertation entitled "Three Essays on Buyer Power Theory, Dominant HMOs, and Technology Transfer.";The first chapter of my dissertation is an investigation into technological transfer efficacy, with success defined at specific levels culminating in revenue generation via licensing or a university-based start-up. Licensing revenue and new venture spin-offs as driven through U.S. university technology transfer offices have been a predominant goal for funded research and development over the last twenty-five years. However, as opposed to patent generation, investigation into the translation of research into viable revenue generation is somewhat sparse. The data used in the analysis is from 400 technology transfer disclosures filed over a ten-year period at a large U.S. research university. We estimate both ordered logit and ordered probit models which allow for our non-continuous, ordinal dependent variable. The results indicate that the significant factors in technology transfer success are the level of experience of the faculty member and participation in an industry sponsored research agreement. Aspects such as team size and academic department/school have no significant impact on technology transfer outcomes. The paper concludes with policy recommendations and directions for future research.;The second chapter of my dissertation examines Health Maintenance Organizations' (HMO) entry decisions in local markets in Florida from 2001 to 2005. Unlike prior research, I analyze HMOs' entry decisions at the firm-level using a discrete-choice approach. I estimate the probability that an HMO will enter a market (HMO entry) as a function of firm characteristics, market characteristics and firm-market characteristics. The results indicate that both firm and market heterogeneity play a significant role in explaining HMO entry in local markets. Specifically, entry decisions in the Florida HMO Market vary substantially across individual HMOs. The geographic location of a HMO's existing operations, distance from a firm's headquarters and the type of firms already operating in a local market significantly impact HMOs' entry decisions. The importance of firm characteristics and firm-market characteristics suggests that some HMOs are better suited to a particular market than others. Thus it appears that HMOs are capitalizing upon the unique features of their organization or product when choosing which markets to enter in Florida.;The third chapter of my dissertation examines the effects of Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) buyer power on both the price and utilization of hospital inpatient services by HMO enrollees. Currently, there are three conflicting theories regarding the effects of HMO buyer power: Monopsony Theory, Welfare-Increasing Theory, and the All-or-None Theory.1 1 A classic Monopsony Theory of the effect of HMO buyer power is advanced by Pauly (1998). Conversely, Feldman and Wholey (2001) argue that HMO buyer power actually has a monopoly-busting effect which I refer to as a Welfare-Increasing Theory. Finally, Herndon (2002) claims the effects of HMO buyer power will be consistent with the All-or-None Theory. I empirically test these theories using data from all general acute-care hospitals in Florida from 2001-2005. Unlike prior research, I control for HMO buyer power, measured as the market share of the largest HMO (Dominant HMO) or the level of HMO concentration (HMO HHI) in a given geographic region, in addition to HMO penetration, the share of a given market that is enrolled in HMOs. I estimate a reduced form model of the impact of HMO buyer power and HMO penetration on the price and quantity of hospital medical procedures and other supply and demand controls. I use instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity of HMO penetration and HMO buyer power. I find that HMO buyer power has a significant negative effect on the price of inpatient hospital services for HMO enrollees and no impact on the number of hospital admissions or inpatient days per HMO enrollee. These results are only consistent with the All-or-None Theory of HMO buyer power.
机译:以下是我的博士论文的三章的摘要:“关于买方权力理论,主要HMO和技术转让的三篇论文。”;论文的第一章是对技术转让效力的研究,并在特定级别定义了成功通过许可或基于大学的初创公司最终实现创收。在过去的25年中,通过美国大学技术转让办公室获得的许可收入和新的风险投资分拆一直是资助研究与开发的主要目标。但是,与专利产生相反,将研究转化为可行的收益产生的研究很少。分析中使用的数据来自美国一所大型研究型大学在十年期间提交的400项技术转让披露信息。我们估计有序logit模型和有序概率模型,这些模型允许我们使用非连续,有序因变量。结果表明,技术转让成功的重要因素是教师的经验水平和参与行业赞助的研究协议。团队规模和学术部门/学校等方面对技术转让成果没有重大影响。最后,本文提出了政策建议和未来研究的方向。本论文的第二章研究了2001年至2005年佛罗里达州本地市场上健康维护组织(HMO)的进入决策。与先前的研究不同,我分析了HMO在以下地区的进入决策:使用离散选择方法的公司级别。我估计了HMO进入市场(HMO进入)的可能性是公司特征,市场特征和公司市场特征的函数。结果表明,公司异质性和市场异质性在解释HMO进入本地市场中起着重要作用。具体而言,佛罗里达州HMO市场的准入决定因各个HMO而有很大差异。 HMO现有业务的地理位置,距公司总部的距离以及已经在本地市场开展业务的公司类型都会对HMO的进入决策产生重大影响。公司特征和公司市场特征的重要性表明,某些HMO比其他HMO更适合特定市场。因此,在选择进入佛罗里达州的市场时,HMO似乎正在利用其组织或产品的独特功能。;论文的第三章考察了健康维护组织(HMO)买方权力对价格和利用的影响。 HMO参与者的医院住院服务的数量。目前,关于HMO买方权力影响的理论有三种相互矛盾的理论:垄断理论,福利增长理论和全有或无理论。11 Pauly(1983)提出了关于HMO买方权力影响的经典垄断理论。 1998)。相反,费尔德曼和威利(Feldman and Wholey,2001)认为,HMO买方权力实际上具有垄断消灭效应,我称之为福利增加理论。最后,Herndon(2002)声称,HMO买方权力的影响将与“全有或全无”理论相一致。我使用2001-2005年佛罗里达州所有普通急症医院的数据对这些理论进行了实证检验。与先前的研究不同,我控制着HMO购买者的力量,衡量方式是在给定地理区域内最大HMO(主导HMO)的市场份额或HMO集中程度(HMO HHI),除了HMO渗透率之外,还包括给定参与HMO的市场。我估计了简化形式的模型,该模型简化了HMO买方权力和HMO渗透对医院医疗程序的价格和数量以及其他供求控制的影响。我使用工具变量来控制HMO渗透和HMO买方权力的潜在内生性。我发现,HMO购买者购买力对HMO参加者的住院医院服务价格具有重大负面影响,而对每个HMO参加者的住院人数或住院天数没有影响。这些结果仅与HMO买方权力的全有或无理论相一致。

著录项

  • 作者

    Gay, Megan.;

  • 作者单位

    Northeastern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northeastern University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Health Sciences Health Care Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 179 p.
  • 总页数 179
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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