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Asset pricing equilibria for heterogeneous, limited-information agents.

机译:异构,有限信息代理的资产定价均衡。

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摘要

The standard general equilibrium asset pricing models typically make two simplifying assumptions: homogeneous agents and the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. This context sometimes yields outcomes that are inconsistent with the empirical findings. We hypothesize that allowing agent heterogeneity could assist in replicating the empirical results. However, the inclusion of heterogeneity in models where agents are fully rational proves impossible to solve without severe simplifying assumptions. The reason for this difficulty is that heterogeneous agent models generate an endogenously complicated distribution of wealth across the agents. The state space for each agent's optimization problem includes the complex dynamics of the wealth distribution. There is no general way to characterize the interaction between the distribution of wealth and the macroeconomic aggregates. To address this issue, we implement an agent-based model where the agents have bounded rationality. In our model, we have a complete markets economy with two agents and two assets. The agents are heterogeneous and utility maximizing with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion [CRRA] preferences. How the agents address the stochastic behaviour of the evolution of the wealth distribution is central to our task since aggregate prices depend on this behaviour. An important component of this dissertation involves dealing with the computational difficulty of dynamic heterogeneous-agent models. That is, in order to predict prices, agents need a way to keep track of the evolution of the wealth distribution. We do this by allowing each agent to assume that a price-equivalent representative agent exists and that the representative agent has a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. In so doing, the agents are able to formulate predictive pricing and demand functions which allow them to predict aggregate prices and make consumption and investment decisions each period. However, the agents' predictions are only approximately correct. Therefore, we introduce a learning mechanism to maintain the required level of accuracy in the agents' price predictions. From this setup, we find that the model, with learning, will converge over time to an approximate expectations equilibrium, provided that the the initial conditions are close enough to the rational expectations equilibrium prices. Two main contributions in our work are:;begin{enumerate} item to formulate a new concept of approximate equilibria, and item to show how equilibria can be approximated numerically, despite the fact that the true state space at any point in time is mathematically complex. end{enumerate}.;These contributions offer the possibility of characterizing a new class of asset pricing models where agents are heterogeneous and only just slightly limited in their rationality. That is, the partially informed agents in our model are able to forecast and utility-maximize only just as well as economists who face problems of estimating aggregate variables. By using an exogenously assigned adaptive learning rule, we analyse this implementation in a Lucas-type heterogeneous agent model. We focus on the sensitivity of the risk parameter and the convergence of the model to an approximate expectations equilibrium. Also, we study the extent to which adaptive learning is able to explain the empirical findings in an asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents.
机译:标准的一般均衡资产定价模型通常会做出两个简化的假设:同质主体和理性预期均衡的存在。在这种情况下,有时得出的结果与实证结果不一致。我们假设允许代理异质性可以帮助复制经验结果。但是,在不完全简化假设的情况下,要证明代理商完全理性的模型中包含异质性是不可能解决的。造成这种困难的原因是,异构主体模型会在各个主体之间生成财富的内生复杂分布。每个代理人的优化问题的状态空间包括财富分配的复杂动态。没有通用的方法可以描述财富分配与宏观经济总量之间的相互作用。为了解决这个问题,我们实现了基于主体的模型,其中主体具有有限的理性。在我们的模型中,我们拥有一个具有两个代理商和两个资产的完整市场经济。这些代理是异构的,并且效用最大化,并且具有相对风险规避[CRRA]偏好的常数。代理商如何应对财富分配演变的随机行为是我们任务的中心,因为总价格取决于这种行为。论文的重要组成部分涉及动态异构代理模型的计算难度。也就是说,为了预测价格,代理商需要一种方法来跟踪财富分配的演变。为此,我们允许每个代理假定存在一个价格等效的代理,并且该代理具有相对恒定的相对风险规避系数。通过这样做,代理商能够制定预测价格和需求函数,从而使他们能够预测总价格并在每个时期做出消费和投资决策。但是,代理商的预测仅是大致正确的。因此,我们引入了一种学习机制来维持代理商价格预测中所需的准确性。从这种设置中,我们发现,只要初始条件足够接近理性预期均衡价格,经过学习,该模型将随着时间收敛到近似预期均衡。我们工作的两个主要贡献是:;开始{enumerate}项以建立近似平衡的新概念,以及表明在数值上如何近似于平衡的项,尽管事实上任何时间点的真实状态空间在数学上都是复杂的。 end {enumerate} 。;这些贡献提供了表征一类新的资产定价模型的可能性,在这些模型中,代理人是异类的,并且其合理性仅受到很小的限制。也就是说,在我们的模型中,只有部分知情的主体才能够预测和效用最大化,就像面临估计总变量问题的经济学家一样。通过使用外部分配的自适应学习规则,我们在Lucas型异构代理模型中分析了此实现。我们专注于风险参数的敏感性和模型对近似期望均衡的收敛。此外,我们研究了适应性学习能够解释具有异构主体的资产定价模型中的经验发现的程度。

著录项

  • 作者

    Jones, Dawna Candice.;

  • 作者单位

    The Florida State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Florida State University.;
  • 学科 Applied mathematics.;Economics.;Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 141 p.
  • 总页数 141
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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