Big 4 global networks: Degree of homogeneity of audit quality among affiliates and relevance of PCAOB inspections.

摘要

The Big 4 global networks (Deloitte, Ernst & Young [E&Y], KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC]) market themselves as providers of worldwide seamless services and consistent audit quality through their members. Under the current environment in which these auditors operate, there are three types of global network members: inspected non-U.S. affiliates (inspected affiliates, hereafter), non-inspected non-U.S. affiliates (non-inspected affiliates, hereafter), and inspected U.S. offices (U.S. offices, hereafter). The recent suspension of the China-based Big 4 affiliates from auditing U.S.-listed companies calls into question whether these global networks can deliver the same level of audit quality across all their members and whether those located in jurisdictions denying access to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board, hereafter) to conduct inspections may benefit from such inspections. This study examines the effect of being an affiliate and the effect of PCAOB inspections on perceived audit quality. I use earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as a proxy for perceived audit quality. This study finds no evidence that affiliates have lower perceived audit quality than that of the U.S. offices. Additionally, I find no evidence that PCAOB inspected members have higher perceived audit quality than that of the non-inspected members. These results are robust to different measures of unexpected returns, unexpected earnings, and to using alternative approaches to determine when an auditor has been inspected. These findings are relevant because they provide evidence that the Big 4 global networks are delivering on their promise of providing similar audit quality through all their members. Additionally, the lack of results of the effect of PCAOB inspections on audit quality is inconsistent with accountability theory but may suggest that the internal review systems and other internally developed mechanisms by the global networks are as effective as external accountability measures.