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Cyberdefense framework for electrical distribution grid.

机译:配电网的网络防御框架。

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摘要

Protecting cyberinfrastructure has been the general security subject that is related to availability, integrity, secrecy, and accountability. Critical infrastructure, such as power grid, has an extremely stringent security protection as compromised cyber assets would significantly impact the physical aspect of operations. This dissertation provides a comprehensive study of the electrical distribution operations that have a broader spectrum of the potentially security-related risks, ranging from the metering integrity to availability of the electrical distribution system. As the next-generation distribution grid would highly rely on the IP-based communication system, it can introduce existing vulnerabilities in protocols, hardware and software that can be the backdoors for attackers as the stepping stone. As this may provide convenient access to the IP-based devices by malicious consumers, the potential tampering can be launched within the vicinity of their home premise by injecting falsified metering information to either avoid paying actual payments of electricity or manipulating the neighborhood metering devices. This scenario is similar to the motive of energy theft. The other attackers' motive would be to gain unauthorized access and covertly modify the IP-based metering devices in large scale by propagating malware worm across the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) network. This dissertation addresses all of the aforementioned issues related to security aspects of the interaction between cyber system and its resulting impact of physical network. The focus of this scholarly archive is three-fold: (1) Integrity -- anti-tampering method identifying the anomalous IP-based energy meters, (2) Availability -- distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) against data collection unit, and (3) Large-scale integrity/availability -- preventive maintenance investigating potential worm propagation across AMI communication network. Each attack scenario has been studied and integrated in the cyberdefense framework addressing the forthcoming security challenges.
机译:保护网络基础设施已成为与可用性,完整性,保密性和责任制相关的一般安全主题。关键基础设施(例如电网)具有极其严格的安全保护,因为受到破坏的网络资产将极大地影响运营的物理方面。本论文对配电业务进行了全面的研究,这些配电业务涉及到与安全相关的潜在风险,涉及范围从计量完整性到配电系统的可用性。由于下一代配电网将高度依赖基于IP的通信系统,因此它可能会在协议,硬件和软件中引入现有的漏洞,这些漏洞可能是攻击者后门的垫脚石。由于这可能使恶意用户方便地访问基于IP的设备,因此可以通过注入伪造的计量信息来避免在家庭住所附近发起篡改,从而避免实际支付电费或操纵附近的计量设备。这种情况类似于能量盗窃的动机。其他攻击者的动机将是通过在高级计量基础结构(AMI)网络中传播恶意软件蠕虫,来获得未经授权的访问并秘密地大规模修改基于IP的计量设备。本文解决了与网络系统之间的交互的安全性及其对物理网络的影响有关的所有前述问题。该学术档案的重点包括三个方面:(1)完整性-识别基于IP的异常电表的防篡改方法,(2)可用性-针对数据收集单元的分布式拒绝服务攻击(DDoS),以及(3)大规模完整性/可用性-预防性维护,调查潜在的蠕虫在AMI通信网络中的传播。已经研究了每种攻击方案,并将其集成到网络防御框架中,以应对即将到来的安全挑战。

著录项

  • 作者

    Guo, Yonghe.;

  • 作者单位

    Michigan Technological University.;

  • 授予单位 Michigan Technological University.;
  • 学科 Engineering.;Electrical engineering.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 224 p.
  • 总页数 224
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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