This dissertation develops a deductive systemic-level theory of national trade strategy and strategy change. The central proposition is that the international economic structure (IES)--the configuration of nations within the dimensions of relative size and relative productivity--and the position of a nation within this structure create constraints and opportunities which shape the trade strategy of that country. Six categories of nations are identified. The constraints and opportunities created by the IES are then explicated through a game-theoretic analysis of the trade policy preferences of each category. Trade strategy is defined as a nation's international market orientation and degree of international political activity and measured by the substance and intent of tariff policy. The principal data sources are the public record and primary materials. The theory is examined in the case of American trade strategy between 1887 and 1939. There were four distinct phases during this period, each associated with a particular IES. Between 1887 and 1897, under a structure of British hegemony, the United States free rode, adopting high protection and neo-mercantilist methods of export expansion. Second, during the era 1897-1912, the United States--facing a structure of declining British hegemony--restrained protection at home and adopted the liberal principle of non-discrimination. Third, between 1912 and 1930, under a structure of bilateral supportership, America reduced its protection and attempted to influence the trade policies of other nations through new and more forceful means. Finally, from 1930 to 1939, the United States, in a structure of unilateral supportership, first pursued a strategy of pre-emptive protection and later, after other nations had retaliated, attempted to reintroduce a modicum of openness into the international economy.
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