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Foundations of a logic of knowledge, action, and communication.

机译:知识,行动和交流逻辑的基础。

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摘要

Most Artificial Intelligence planners work on the assumption that they have complete knowledge of their problem domain and situation, so that planning an action consists of searching for an action sequence that achieves some desired goal. In actual planning situations, agents rarely know enough to map out a detailed plan of action when they start out. Instead, they initially draw up a sketchy plan and fill in details as they proceed.;This thesis presents a formalism that is expressive enough to describe this flexible planning process. We address ourselves to two central issues: (1) How can an agent determine that he knows enough to do an action? (Knowledge Preconditions Problem) (2) If the agent does not know enough, how can he plan to get the action done? (Ignorant Agent Problem).;We demonstrate that modal logic is too weak to serve as the basis for such a theory, and choose instead to work within a first order logic augmented with quotation. We then discuss the Knower Paradoxes that arise from such syntactic treatments of knowledge, and propose a solution to these paradoxes based on Kripke's solution to the Liar Paradox. Next, we present a theory of action and planning that is powerful enough to describe partial plans and joint-effort plans. We then explain what knowledge an agent must have in order to successfully perform an action and how an ignorant agent can construct and execute complex plans in order to overcome his ignorance. A central observation underlying our solution to the Ignorant Agent Problem is that ignorant agents tend to use communicative acts, such as asking for information, and delegating, to plan around their ignorance. During the final part of this thesis, we therefore develop a theory of communication as an integrated part of our theory of action and planning. We show that this theory of communication is more expressive than standard Austinian-type speech act theories.;The thesis includes comparisons of our theory with other syntactic and modal theories such as Konolige's and Moore's. We demonstrate that our theory is powerful enough to solve classes of problems that these theories cannot handle.
机译:大多数人工智能计划者的假设是,他们对问题领域和情况有全面的了解,因此,对行动进行计划包括寻找能够实现某些预期目标的行动序列。在实际的计划情况下,座席刚开始时很少了解足够的知识来制定详细的行动计划。取而代之的是,他们最初拟定了一个粗略的计划,并在进行过程中填写了细节。本论文提出了一种形式主义,足以描述这种灵活的计划过程。我们针对以下两个核心问题解决自己:(1)代理人如何确定自己足够了解采取行动? (知识前提条件问题)(2)如果座席了解的不够多,他如何计划完成该动作? (无知代理问题)。;我们证明了模态逻辑太弱而不能用作这种理论的基础,而是选择在加引号的一阶逻辑中工作。然后,我们讨论由这种知识的句法处理引起的Knower悖论,并在Kripke对Liar悖论的解决方案的基础上提出对这些悖论的解决方案。接下来,我们提出一种行动和计划理论,该理论足以描述部分计划和联合努力计划。然后,我们解释了代理人必须具备哪些知识才能成功执行某项操作,以及无知的代理人如何能够构建和执行复杂的计划以克服其无知。我们对“无知代理人”问题的解决方案背后的主要观察结果是,无知代理人倾向于使用交流行为,例如索取信息和委派,以计划他们的无知。因此,在本文的最后部分,我们将传播理论发展为行动和计划理论的有机组成部分。我们证明了这种交流理论比标准的奥斯丁式言语行为理论更具表达力。论文包括对我们的理论与其他句法和情态理论(例如,科诺里奇和摩尔)的比较。我们证明了我们的理论足以解决这些理论无法处理的问题。

著录项

  • 作者

    Morgenstern, Leora.;

  • 作者单位

    New York University.;

  • 授予单位 New York University.;
  • 学科 Computer Science.;Artificial Intelligence.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1988
  • 页码 329 p.
  • 总页数 329
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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