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The association between selected corporate attributes and management incentives for voluntary accounting disclosure.

机译:选定的公司属性与自愿性会计信息披露的管理激励措施之间的关联。

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摘要

A major argument in favor of the regulation of accounting standards is that voluntary disclosure alone is not able to enhance public welfare. This research has examined the incentives of those who do voluntarily disclose accounting information when not mandated to do so. According to the major theory of this research, signaling theory, managers of higher quality firms have incentives to signal to the market their higher quality to distinguish themselves from average or lower quality firms. One form of signaling is voluntary disclosure of information about a firm's operations.; Signaling theory is tested in two voluntary accounting disclosure scenarios: release of line of business data, and disclosure of management forecasts. The research design features both a market response analysis, to determine how the market perceives the disclosure signals of management, and a cross-sectional analysis which compares firm attributes of disclosing firms. Three competing hypotheses: (a) lack of full disclosure, (b) differential proprietary costs, and (c) expected changes in financing, production, and investment decisions, which offer alternative explanations are also examined.; The expected finding that disclosing firms are better stock market performers than nondisclosing firms was not supported by tests of abnormal returns, security return deviations, and beta values. It appears the market makes no measureable distinction between the disclosure act and the content of this disclosure.; The results of cross-sectional analyses of the management forecasts and line-of-business disclosure issue indicate that there are differences of firm value characteristics between disclosing firms and nondisclosing firms, but not in all years. An even stronger finding is that disclosure appears to be accompanied by other firm dynamics. Specifically, firms which disclose do so in association with their financing, production, and investment opportunities.
机译:支持规范会计准则的一个主要论点是,仅自愿披露并不能提高公共福利。这项研究调查了自愿披露会计信息而未获授权的人的动机。根据本研究的主要理论,即信号理论,较高质量公司的经理人有动机向市场发出较高质量的信号,以区别于中等或较低质量的公司。信号的一种形式是自愿披露有关公司运营的信息。信号理论在两种自愿性会计披露情景中进行了测试:业务数据的发布和管理预测的披露。该研究设计既包括市场响应分析(用于确定市场如何看待管理层的公开信号),也包括横截面分析,用于比较披露公司的公司属性。三种相互竞争的假设:(a)缺乏充分的披露,(b)专有成本的差异,(c)融资,生产和投资决策的预期变化,它们也提供了其他解释。异常收益,安全收益偏差和β值的测试并不能证明披露公司比不披露公司要好于股票市场表现的预期发现。市场似乎在披露行为与本披露内容之间没有可衡量的区别。管理层预测和业务线披露问题的横断面分析结果表明,披露公司与不披露公司之间的公司价值特征存在差异,但并非所有年份都存在差异。一个更强有力的发现是,披露似乎还伴随着其他公司动态。具体而言,披露信息的公司会与其融资,生产和投资机会相关联。

著录项

  • 作者

    Morris, Norma Williams.;

  • 作者单位

    Texas A&M University.;

  • 授予单位 Texas A&M University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.; Business Administration Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1989
  • 页码 321 p.
  • 总页数 321
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;贸易经济;
  • 关键词

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