Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person: An adequate portrayal of human freedom?

摘要

Carl Rogers, a leading figure in the Third Force Psychology, was keenly aware of the inadequacies of scientific psychology. He accurately observed that the main problem with psychology as a natural science is its approach, or philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of the human being. For scientific psychology, persons are predetermined objects and human behaviour is nothing but causally determined reactions to external stimuli. In Persons or science: A philosophical question (1955) Rogers attempts to develop psychology into a human science. This science adopts a new approach, one which recognizes human freedom. From this new approach emerges his alternative view of the optimal human being, the fully functioning person. The purpose of this research is to explore the extent to which the Rogerian view of human freedom, as it is expressed in the concept of the fully functioning person, adequately establishes the specific difference between persons as free subjects and the determined objects of the natural sciences.;The method adopted for this study is philosophical analysis. We will first situate Rogers in the historical and philosophical context in which he was trained and educated and which led him to oppose scientific psychology (chapter I). Next, the analysis (chapter II) will focus on the distinctive features of Rogers' fully functioning person. The evaluation (chapter III) will confront Rogers' attempt to develop a science of persons with the work of researchers known for their contribution in making psychology into a human science. These researchers are: Giorgi (1970), Luijpen (1962), and Strasser (1963). (Abstract shortened by UMI.).