Lobbying behavior in international accounting standard setting: Evidence from the IASC's Comparability Project.

摘要

Accounting practitioners and academics have recognized the importance of more uniform worldwide accounting standards to expedite transnational financial activities. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is considered the leader in this area. The IASC recently began to reconsider its previously issued standards through the Comparability/Improvements Project. In January 1989, a massive change concerning 29 accounting issues was proposed to narrow the number of accounting choices. The IASC has also adopted a more open due process since then.;This study applies the lobbying research paradigm to the international accounting environment. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and subsequent studies have examined lobbying efforts in accounting standard setting in association with lobbyists' accounting preference. However, these studies dealt with mandatory standards of accounting practices confined within national boundaries. In this study, the dynamic relationships between national-specific variables and lobbying efforts of member countries of IASC in the international accounting standard setting process are investigated. Comment letters submitted on the exposure drafts issued under the Comparability/Improvements Project were examined. Six variables were developed based on the economic consequence theory, the ruling elite concept, and the clustering approach in accounting, to predict the lobbying participation and lobbying positions of IASC member countries. Several univariate tests including t-tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, chi-square tests, and Fisher's Exact tests as well as nonlinear probability logistic regression (logit) analysis were conducted to test the hypotheses.;The empirical results show that most of lobbying countries in the IASC standard setting process are more likely of the micro-based economy group and more likely to have larger stock markets and outward multinational corporation investment. Also found is the domination of founding countries of IASC in the process, though this by no mean that they have agreement on the issues being proposed. Another finding indicates that countries submitting comments are more likely to oppose than to support the proposed standard. However, a conflict between national standards and proposed IASC standards does not contribute to the explanation of lobbying activities in international accounting standard setting. Similarly, a high dependency level on IASC standards has an insignificant impact on the lobbying activities.